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Abstract. Coevolutionary optimisation suffers from a series of problems that
interfere with the progressive escalating arms races that are hoped might solve
difﬁcult classes of optimisation problem. Here we explore the extent to which
encouraging moderation in one coevolving population (termed parasites) can al-
leviate the problem of coevolutionary disengagement. Results suggest that, under
these conditions, disengagement is avoided through maintaining variation in rel-
ative ﬁtness scores. In order to explore whether standard diversity maintenance
techniques such as resource sharing could achieve the same effects, we com-
pare moderating virulence with resource sharing in a simple matching game. We
demonstrate that moderating parasite virulence differs signiﬁcantly from resource
sharing, and that its tendency to prevent disengagement can also reduce the like-
lihood of coevolutionary optimisation halting at mediocre stable states.
1 Introduction
Offering an attractive alternative to standard evolutionary approaches—by removing
the difﬁcult but necessary task of deﬁning an adequate ﬁtness function—competitive
coevolution has been successfully utilised for optimisation in several domains (for e.g.,
[1,2])However,asanoptimisationtechnique,competitivecoevolutionsuffersfromsome
difﬁcult problems stemming from the relative nature of ﬁtness assessment—individuals
receive a ﬁtness based upon their success against contemporary opponents.
In general, coevolutionary systems are difﬁcult to direct. Individuals may over-ﬁt
theircontemporarycompetitors,resultinginpotentiallybrittlesolutions[3].Ratherthan
enter a progressive arms-race, competing populations may stabilise into a sub-optimal
equilibrium, or mediocre stable state [2,4] As individuals are only rewarded for out-
performing their contemporary opponents, it is possible for earlier adaptations to lost,
potentially leading to cycling [4,5]. Finally, if one population outperforms the other to
the extent that every opponent is beaten, the gradient for selection disappears and the
populations disengage and drift [3,6]. As drift during disengagement is random rather
than neutral, near-optimal populations are likely to degenerate.
Although there are methods for counter-acting particular coevolutionary problems,
(e.g., ﬁtness sharing and the “hall of fame” [7]), few of these address the problem of
disengagement (one exception is the domain-speciﬁc approach presented in [4]). In this
paper we present a biologically inspired method for combating coevolutionary disen-
gagement by moderating parasite virulence. Continuing upon previous work [6], we
demonstrate that reducing parasite virulence can reduce the effects of disengagement in
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the Counting Ones domain. The possibility that disengagement could also be combated
via existing techniques for maintaining population diversity is considered. In order to
explore this, a simple Matching Game is used to compare the effects of moderating
virulence with those of resource sharing, a common diversity maintenance technique.
We demonstrate that, whilst ﬁtness sharing encourages phenotypic diversity via nich-
ing, which is prone to mediocre stability, moderating virulence tackles disengagement
through increasing diversity in relative ﬁtness scores, which actively resists mediocre
stabilityinthescenariosthatweconsider.Fundamentally,moderatingparasitevirulence
is not just an apparatus for maintaining population diversity.
2 Moderating Parasite Virulence
Artiﬁcial coevolutionary systems are often described as analogous to natural predator-
prey or host-parasite systems. Given that most coevolutionary algorithms employ only
two populations, the host-parasite analogy is probably closer [8]—one population is
typically considered to pose problems for the other resulting in a series of adaptations
and counter-adaptations that may result in an escalating arms-race.
Coevolutionary algorithms typically differ from natural systems in the way that they
deal with parasite virulence. In order to ensure survival long enough to reproduce, it is
not always in the best interests of a natural parasite to be as virulent as possible [9].As a
result,virulencevariesdramaticallybetweennaturalhost-parasitesystems(compare,for
instance, cholera and the common cold), and over time within a particular system (e.g.,
the history of the myxoma virus inAustralian rabbit populations [10]). However, when
parasites are used in artiﬁcial coevolution, they are generally encoded to be maximally
virulent—their ﬁtness varies inversely with the success of the hosts that they compete
against. Might coevolutionary algorithms beneﬁt from treating parasite virulence more
naturally?
Coevolutionarydisengagementoccurswhenonepopulationsecuresasigniﬁcantad-
vantage over the other, such that each competitor from the advantaged population beats
each of their opponents in competition. In this way, individuals in both populations be-
come indiscriminable in terms of ﬁtness, all scoring maximally in one population and
minimallyintheother.Withoutintra-populationﬁtnessdiversitytherecanbenoselective
forces—each individual is as likely to reproduce as any other—resulting in coevolution-
ary drift. Disengagement continues until the populations re-engage by chance, by which
time there may have been a dramatic reduction in the objective quality (absolute ﬁtness)
of both populations—disengagement hinders optimisation [6].
Often,coevolutionarysystemsareasymmetric—hostsandparasitesmaydiffergenet-
ically(intermsofencoding)orbehaviourally(intermsofgoalstrategy).Suchasymmetry
may result in an inherent advantage for one population. When coevolving pursuers and
evaders, for example, it is often much easier, at least initially, to be a successful evader
[5]. Given that disengagement results from one population out-performing the other, it
is intuitive that an inherent asymmetrical advantage toward a particular population will
encourage the likelihood of coevolutionary disengagement.
However, if parasite virulence were moderated—favouring parasites that achieve
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ing parasites capable of discriminating hosts—those that occasionally lose—with more
offspring, the asymmetrical advantage will be reduced. Moderating virulence may thus
reduce the likelihood of disengagement. Critically, preventing disengagement will im-
prove coevolutionary optimisation if a reduction in periods of degrading coevolutionary
drift can be achieved without sacriﬁcing the selection pressure that ensures progress.
Implementing Moderated Virulence. Canonically, parasites receive ﬁtness propor-
tionally to their ability to defeat the hosts they compete against. In order to moderate
parasite virulence it is necessary to change this relationship. Throughout this paper we
use the term score to refer to the ability of a parasite to defeat the hosts it is pitted
against. Parasite scores are normalised with respect to the maximum score achieved that
generation such that the best current parasite always achieves a score of 1. We deﬁne
parasite ﬁtness as a function of score, x, and virulence, λ (0.5 ≤ λ ≤ 1.0), such that:
f(x,λ)=2x
λ − x
2
λ2.Thus,aparasiteachievesoptimumﬁtnessbywinningaproportion
of contests equal to a fraction λ of that achieved by the best parasite. By varying λ, par-
asites can be encouraged to be more, or less, virulent.Although there is a continuum of
possible curves, throughout this paper, we use only three values of λ. These are labelled
as maximum virulence (λ =1 .0) where parasites are encouraged to beat as many hosts
as possible, moderate virulence (λ =0 .75) where parasites are encouraged to achieve
a win-rate three-quarters that of the highest scoring current parasite, and null virulence
(λ =0 .5), where the ﬁttest parasites achieve half the win-rate of their highest-scoring
conspeciﬁcs. Notice that a value of lambda lower than 0.5 would encourage cooperation
between parasites and hosts.
3 Study One: Counting Ones
In order to introduce the concept of coevolutionary disengagement,Watson and Pollack
[3] used a minimal substrate to highlight the effects of disengagement in the Counting
Ones domain. In this section we utilise an adaptation of the Counting Ones domain to
demonstrate the effect that moderating virulence has upon disengagement.
Tworeproductivelyisolatedpopulationsofsize25arecoevolved.Individualsineach
population consist of binary strings containing 100 bits, with each bit initialised to 0 in
generation 0. The aim of the Counting Ones problem is to evolve strings containing
as many ones as possible. Of course, in this toy example, as observers we can assess
the absolute ﬁtness or objective quality of each individual by counting its 1-alleles.
This allows us, as experimenters, a useful way of measuring progress. However, the
coevolutionaryalgorithmdoesnotmakeuseofthisabsolutemeasure,onlyhavingaccess
to the relative ﬁtness measure described below.
Members of one population are selected to play a set of pair-wise contests against
a random sample of 5 opponents from the competing population. During each contest,
the individual with the genotype containing the greatest number of 1-alleles receives
a ﬁtness point. Each opponent receives half a ﬁtness point for contests resulting in a
draw. Individuals in both populations reproduce asexually with parents chosen through
tournament selection (tournament size 5; winner reproduces). Offspring have a small
probability of mutation, m. Unless speciﬁed otherwise, m =0 .03.302 J. Cartlidge and S. Bullock
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Fig.1.Typical results from the Counting Ones domain (Bp =0 .75; same random seed each run).
AnasymmetrywasintroducedbyvaryingmutationbiasBp (0 ≤ Bp ≤ 1)infavorof
one of the two coevolving populations, henceforth classiﬁed as the parasite population.
Given mutation at a particular parasite locus, the substitution of a 1 or 0 occurs with
probability Bp and (1 − Bp), respectively. In contrast, the coevolving host population
substitutes a 0 or 1 with equal likelihood whenever mutation occurs. We thus see that
if Bp > 0.5, then there is a bias in favour of evolving parasites with more ones—an
asymmetry that favours the parasite population.
This type of problem asymmetry is common in coevolutionary problems. It is often
the case that one side of the coevolutionary contest enjoys some (perhaps temporary)
advantage over the other in terms of the ease with which successful counter-adaptations
arediscovered.Forexample,attheoutsetofcoevolvinglist-sortingalgorithmsitiseasier
to ﬁnd a list that is difﬁcult to sort than an algorithm that is difﬁcult to defeat [1].
Several parasite mutation bias values and three parasite virulence levels were tested
overaseriesofruns;Bp =[ 0 .50,0.99]andλ =0 .50,0.75,1.0.Unlessotherwisestated,
the value of λ remained constant throughout each run.
Results. Fig. 1 displays three stereotypical runs, each using a parasite mutation bias,
Bp,o f0.75.When using maximally virulent parasites (Fig. 1, left) the populations have
a tendency to disengage. This can be observed between generations 150 − 175 and
again between 250 − 500. During these periods of disengagement the populations drift
back to their relative baseline performance, equal to the mutation bias, Bp =0 .75 and
Bhost =0 .5. Only once the populations re-engage by chance is there an improvement
in absolute ﬁtness. Repeating the run with the same random seed, the second period
of disengagement depicted in Fig. 1 is prevented if moderate virulence is introduced
at generation 250 (middle). Notice that the left and middle graphs are identical until
generation250—thepointatwhichparasitevirulenceischangedtomoderate.Incontrast
tomaximumvirulence,whenmoderateparasitesareused(right),thepopulationsremain
engaged throughout the entire run, achieving a continuously high level of performance.
These results are sensitive to variation in both population size and the number of
opponents played by each individual. As either parameter increases, the probability of
disengagement decreases due to the increased frequency of meeting varied opponents.
However, the results observed in this section are qualitatively robust to mutation rate
(m =[ 0 .005,0.05]) and tournament size (tourney =[ 2 ,15]).Caring versus Sharing: How to Maintain Engagement and Diversity 303
Fig. 1 clearly demonstrates that moderating parasite virulence in asymmetric coevo-
lutioncanreducetheeffectsofdisengagement.Furtherresults(notshown1)alsosuggest
that the greater the inherent asymmetry, the greater the effect moderating virulence has
upon results—i.e., in order to reduce disengagement, virulence should be reduced as
engagement increases. The asymmetry imposed in this model gave the biased parasite
population a great advantage over the coevolving host population. Purely by stochastic
effects one would expect all the individuals from parasite populations to contain more
ones than individuals in host populations. This is observed in Fig. 1. The mutation bias
alonepushesthepopulationstowardtheexpectedratioofonestozeros,i.e.,0.50forhosts
and 0.75 for the parasites. The difference in ﬁtness acceleration between populations,
forced by the mutation bias, ensures that once disengagement occurs, the populations
quicklydivergetodifferentequilibriumlevels.Bothpopulationswillremaindisengaged
until a very large, and thus very unlikely, mutation occurs allowing the gap to be, at least
temporarily, bridged, for e.g., Fig. 1, left, generation 500.
The ﬁrst non-zero parasite generation will on average contain many more ones than
the host population. However, under moderated virulence, any parasites that beat all
opponents are less ﬁt than those parasites that lose a small percentage of contests. In
this way, acceleration is decreased as the parasites resist their mutation bias. Moder-
ate virulence parasites appear to actively prevent disengagement. Using the continuous
selection pressure hosts evolve to a greater level than would otherwise be possible. It
should not be overlooked, however, that moderate parasites gain from this relationship
too, as both populations evolve to a greater standard than either would alone (Fig. 1,
right). However, as parasite virulence is decreased there is a tendency for coevolution
to stagnate at a sub-optimal but highly engaged ﬂuid local optimum. In order to push
populations to optimal solutions, stronger selection pressure is required (see below).
DiversityMaintenance. Disengagementoccurswhenintra-populationﬁtnessdiversity
reduces to zero. Moderating virulence counter-acts disengagement by selecting for re-
production parasites that are occasionally beaten.This preserves a selection gradient for
hosts which, in turn, maintains relative ﬁtness diversity in both populations.
A tendency toward reduced population diversity (and associated premature conver-
gence)haslongbeenamajorconcernoftheevolutionarycomputationresearchcommu-
nity.As such, a suite of diversity maintenance techniques have been proposed, including
for e.g., competitive ﬁtness sharing [7], resource sharing [4], and spatial embedding [1].
These approaches are attempts to maintain genetic diversity on the assumption that a
loss of diversity can be harmful to optimisation as it may restrict search to local optima.
Resource (or competitive ﬁtness) sharing maintains genetic diversity in a population
by encouraging niching—individuals are rewarded for being able to beat opponents
that few others can. This idea has been extended to coevolutionary scenarios where
opponents are treated as a commodity or resource. Rather than gain a ﬁtness point for
each victory against an opponent (simple ﬁtness), one ﬁtness point is shared among the
competitorsthatbeataparticularindividual.Thus,individualsarerewardedlessforhow
many opponents they beat and more for who they beat, rewarding genetic novelty and
maintaining diversity.
1 see [6], also http://www.comp.leeds.ac.uk/johnc/publications/ecal03long.pdf304 J. Cartlidge and S. Bullock
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try to match either 0− or 1-alleles (right).
Since disengagement is associated with a loss of diversity, could it be prevented by
simple diversity maintenance approaches? Perhaps moderating virulence is only pre-
venting disengagement by mimicking these existing techniques? If so, it is largely su-
perﬂuous. The next study contrasts moderating virulence with resource sharing in order
to explore whether they are effectively the same or different in some fundamental sense.
4 Study Two: Matching Game
In order to compare the inﬂuence of parasite (and host) resource sharing with that of
moderating parasite virulence, we need to choose an appropriate and simple problem
domain. Here we develop a simple matching game, in which hosts are rewarded for
matching parasites, but parasites are punished. Games with this type of dynamic often
suffer from coevolutionary cycling, as hosts chase parasites through the strategy space.
Althoughaglobaloptimumstrategyexists,populationsareeasilydivertedfromitasthey
exploit the temporary idiosyncrasies of their opponents. Resource sharing is one way
of discouraging this type of short-termist behaviour. By maintaining a diverse strategy-
base in each population, the value of exploiting idiosyncrasies is reduced, encouraging
generalists. Unfortunately, an alternative mediocre stable scenario is possible in which
populations“speciate”suchthattheyexhibitanumberofdifferentsub-optimalstrategies
that together form a stable combination. In this sense, the game is similar to any number
of scenarios in which a generalist strategy is globally optimum, but difﬁcult to evolve in
practice—e.g., scissors-paper-stone, immune systems, etc.
Two genetically isolated populations of size 50 are coevolved—hosts and parasites.
Individuals in each population consist of binary strings containing 100 bits, initialised
randomly in generation 0. Each generation, members of the host population are selected
to play a set of pair-wise contests against a random sample of 10 opponents from the
parasite population. The aim for hosts is to match as many parasite alleles as possible.
Antagonistically, parasites aim to mis-match host alleles. Both populations breed asex-
ually, with each individual having a small probability of unbiased mutation per locus,
m =0 .03 Tournament selection was used (tournament size 5) with the winner of each
tournament always chosen to reproduce.
Notalllociareinvolvedinthismatchinggame.Forparasiteswithmany1-alleles,the
matching game tends to involve only those loci at which the parasite possesses 1-alleles.Caring versus Sharing: How to Maintain Engagement and Diversity 305
For parasites with many 0-alleles, the game tends to involve only those loci at which
the parasite possesses 0-alleles. Whether 1-allele loci or 0-allele loci are involved is
determined probabilistically. The probability, p, of a game involving matching 1-alleles
increases with the total number of 1-alleles. Once the game has been decided, a host
wins by matching alleles in at least T =3 0loci, else the parasite wins (see Fig. 2).
Having several antagonistic points of attraction, the Matching Game domain is de-
signed to exhibit interesting coevolutionary dynamics. Mutation bias attracts both pop-
ulations toward genotypes containing 50% 1-alleles and 50% 0-alleles. However, given
a host plays a parasite at the 1-allele (0-allele) half of the matching game, it is advan-
tageous for the host to have as many 1s (or 0s) as possible. Thus, the host population
is attracted toward homogeneous genotypes (all 1so ra l l0s). The direction of attraction
for hosts (toward either 100% 1-o r0-alleles) depends upon the frequency with which
the parasite population plays either the 1-allele or 0-allele halves of the game. This oc-
curs with increasing frequency the further parasite genotypes vary from 50% 1s. Thus,
parasites are also attracted away from 50% 1s, but in the opposite direction to hosts.
Parasites deviating too far from 50% 1s, however, become too predictable. In general,
the most difﬁcult parasites to match are those having approximately 50% 1s.
This matching game resembles the density classiﬁcation task for 1-D cellular au-
tomata. The aim of the density classiﬁcation task is to evolve a set of cellular automata
(CA) rules which correctly classify the density of an initial condition (IC)—a binary
string—as having less than, or more than, 50% 1s. Whilst coevolving CA rules, Juill´ e
and Pollack found it necessary to moderate the virulence of ICs in order to stop dis-
engagement, despite the use of resource sharing [4]. Although very successful, their
approach is domain dependent, relying heavily upon domain-speciﬁc knowledge. As
such, it is not transferable to arbitrary coevolutionary optimisation scenarios. Here we
tease apart the contribution of two domain general approaches to improving coevolu-
tionary optimisation, resource sharing and moderating parasite virulence.
As before, three λ values were tested over a series of runs; λ =1 .0 (maximum),
λ =0 .75 (moderate) and λ =0 .5 (null). The value of λ remained constant throughout
each run. Runs were performed under four conditions: maximum virulence without
resourcesharing(i.e.,standardcoevolution);maximumvirulencewithresourcesharing;
moderated virulence without resource sharing; both moderated virulence and resource
sharing. Under each condition, the degree of niching or genotypic diversity within each
population was calculated using a linkage disequilibrium measure, particularly sensitive
to the effects of resource sharing.
Results. Fig. 3 displays four stereotypical graphs from the Matching Game domain,
resulting from the four test conditions. Both resource sharing and moderating parasite
virulence have clear effects on coevolutionary dynamics.
Under condition one—maximum virulence with no resource sharing, i.e., typical
coevolutionary optimisation (top-left)—the system exhibits cycling. After the initial
generations, hosts may begin to recruit more 1-alleles in order to defeat parasites play-
ing the 1-allele half of the game. However, as parasites counter-adapt, by recruiting
more 0-alleles, they increase the likelihood of playing the 0-allele half of the game.
In response, hosts appear with a greater proportion of 0s, with the entire population306 J. Cartlidge and S. Bullock
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Fig.3. Typical coevolution in the Matching Game domain.
eventually switching strategy, in order to concentrate on winning the 0-half of the game.
Subsequently, parasites again regain the upper-hand by recruiting 1-alleles, and so on.
Under these conditions, the Matching Game is inherently easier for the parasite popula-
tion. Hosts ﬁnd it difﬁcult to be successful generalists—incapable of matching parasites
along both dimensions—and are encouraged to become brittle specialists. As a result,
maximally virulent parasites win the majority of competitions and occasionally win all
competitions, resulting in disengagement (indicated by crosses).
Under condition two—maximum virulence with resource sharing (top-right)—the
system reaches mediocre stability.At the beginning of the run, hosts immediately niche
into two groups, each specialising on one half of the matching game. In order to be
as unpredictable as possible, parasites tend toward 50% 1s—any deviation from this
distribution will be punished by one of the specialist host niches. At this mediocre
equilibriumthehostpopulationasawholeachievesroughly50%victoriesoverparasites,
but each individual host is extremely vulnerable to parasites playing the opposite half of
the game. In contrast, parasites tend to become maximally unpredictable and play either
halfofthematchinggamewithroughlyequalprobability.Althoughageneraliststrategy
exists for hosts, they are unable to discover it.
Under condition three—moderated virulence (λ =0 .5) without resource sharing
(bottom-left)—the system stabilises with generalist hosts. After the initial generations,
the host population settles into generalist strategies, capable of matching some parasites
whichever allele is triggered. Moderate virulence ensures that parasites are rewarded
when occasionally matched, thus allowing hosts to succeed without having to concen-
trate on winning one half of the matching game. It should be noticed that moderating
virulence does not result in host-parasite collusion, which would tend to result in ho-
mogeneous parasites—the simplest to match. Rather, parasites remain challenging and
unpredictable.Anydeviationfrom50%1sisquicklypunishedbythegeneralisthosts.AsCaring versus Sharing: How to Maintain Engagement and Diversity 307
such,bothhostsandparasitesengageincompetitioninthemostdifﬁcultregionsofspace.
This is equivalent to discovering the “play random” strategy in scissors-paper-stone, or
a generalist immune system capable of defeating a wide range of intruders.
Under condition four—moderated virulence with resource sharing (bottom-right)—
the system initially achieves mediocre stability, before encouraging hosts to become
generalists, strongly engaged with parasites. Early in the run, resource sharing encour-
ages the host population into two niches, each concentrating on one half of the matching
game.Inthisway,thesystemreachesmediocrestabilitywithhostsandparasitessharing
victories. However, unlike condition two, mediocre stability does not persist. Recall that
null virulence encourages parasites to achieve a win-rate half that of the highest scoring
parasite. This scheme lures parasites away from the mediocre equilibrium at which they
achievea50%win-rate.Asparasitesbecomemoreeasilymatched,theyreducethepres-
sure upon hosts to concentrate on one half of the matching game. In this way hosts are
steered toward a more generalist strategy of 50% 1s. Hosts engage parasites in a difﬁcult
region of space, unattainable without moderated parasite virulence.
Results clearly demonstrate that imposing moderate virulence on parasites alters
coevolutionary dynamics in a fundamentally different way to that achieved by resource
sharing.Whilstresourcesharingencourageswithin-populationgenetic(andphenotypic)
diversity, observable as niching in the host population, moderate virulence encourages
diversity in relative ﬁtness.
5 Conclusions
We have demonstrated the effects that resource sharing and moderating virulence have
uponcoevolutionarydynamics.Thoughbothtoolsincreasediversityeachaffectscoevo-
lutioninafundamentallydifferentmanner.Resourcesharingencouragesapopulationto
diversify into separate niches, thus reducing the likelihood of over-focusing and coevo-
lutionary cycling. However, niching may produce mediocre stability—reaching a sub-
optimal equilibrium—whereby niches share success. In contrast, moderating virulence
does not encourage intra-population diversity and rather encourages engagement—the
extent to which coevolving populations interact.
Resourcesharingaddsasecondlayerofcouplingbetweenconspeciﬁcs.Inadditionto
the standard competition that conspeciﬁcs experience—striving to beat more opponents
thaneachother—theyareforcedtosharetheirsuccesswithoneanother.Thisencourages
individuals to beat different opponents—i.e., to be different from one another. Niching
results from this additional intra-population coupling. In contrast, moderating parasite
virulenceincreasesinter-populationcoupling—itensuresthatindividualsinonepopula-
tioncareaboutthesuccessofindividualsintheother.Inparticular,throughattemptingto
achieve moderate success, parasites care about the variation in relative ﬁtness achieved
by their opponents—they are selected to cause a range of scores in their opponents.
However, this is not achieved through niching, or genetic diversity per se. Rather, it is a
direct consequence of the moderation that maintains engagement.
It is true that increased genetic diversity has some relationship with coevolutionary
engagement.Ifgeneticdiversityreducestozero,populationswilldisengage(individuals
willachieveequivalentscores).However,theconverseisnottrue.Geneticdiversitydoes308 J. Cartlidge and S. Bullock
not ensure engagement. Both populations may feature a diverse array of phenotypes, yet
still suffer disengagement if each and every phenotype in one population defeats each
and every phenotype in the other. Indeed, periods of disengagement often increase ge-
netic diversity through random drift without necessarily increasing engagement. While
this coevolutionary coupling (engagedness) is affected by genetic diversity (and noise,
sampling error, etc.), it is not determined by it. These considerations ensure that mod-
erating virulence and resource sharing are complimentary, rather than exclusive, tools.
It is not necessary to choose one over another. Indeed, the greatest success may result
from using both [4].
Finally,itisimportanttore-iteratethefactthatmoderatingvirulenceinvolvesatrade-
off between engagedness and optimisation. Whilst reducing λ increases engagement,
optimisation may suffer as a result, since parasites are being encouraged to present
a less-than perfect opponent. Balancing this trade-off—maintaining engagement while
encouragingoptimisation—provestobequitedifﬁcult.Ingeneral,aparametersuchasλ
mustbeconstantlyalteredoverthecourseofcoevolutiontoachievethisoptimalbalance.
Currently we have no successful way of adaptively altering λ. Future work involving
an experimental interface for manually steering virulence during coevolution [11], will
aim to discover insights into disengagement that lead to a technique for automatically
adapting virulence in the necessary manner.
In conclusion, this paper has demonstrated that moderating virulence is not an
alternative diversity maintenance technique but a complementary, and novel domain-
independent tool, capable of improving coevolutionary optimisation through reducing
coevolutionary disengagement.
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